This essay first appeared on November 19, 2026 in Law & Liberty.
In two earlier columns for Law & Liberty, I explained why state laws requiring open or semi-open party primary elections may violate the First Amendment to the US Constitution. This column rounds out the subject by addressing common defenses of those laws, including those found in a recent response to my previous essays.
In the traditional closed primary, only party members can choose among the candidates seeking the party’s nomination for the general election. When a state mandates that parties conduct an open primary, any elector, whether or not registered with a party, may vote in any party’s primary. In a mandatory semi-open system (also called semi-closed), unaffiliated electors are privileged in that they may vote in any primary, while those registered with a party are restricted to that party’s contests. Under both open and semi-open primary laws, people who refuse to join a party largely dictate whom it nominates. They also affect the political positions the candidates take.
In some settings, such as in modern Colorado (which has a semi-open scheme), non-party members—some hostile to party goals—form a huge portion of the primary election electorate. Their preferences can overwhelm the choice of the people who actually register with the party, who finance its operations, who serve on its committees, and who perform its legwork.
As I also noted earlier, open and semi-open primary laws have existed for some time—but a national campaign has been launched to induce more states to enact them. The campaign is conducted principally by center-left groups. One apparent motivation is to increase the chances of moderate-to-liberal Republican candidates as opposed to strong social or fiscal conservatives. Thus, promotional material from groups advocating open and semi-open primary laws touts the virtue of securing general election candidates who are less “extreme” and “partisan” than party members might prefer.
The constitutional obstacle to mandatory open and semi-open primary laws is the First Amendment right of free association. The First Amendment protects the right of people to form and join organizations. It also protects their right to exclude those unsympathetic to the common goals, since unsympathetic people might cloud the organization’s message and damage its effectiveness. (These constitutional problems do not impair laws that render party use of an open or semi-open primary optional.)
The Supreme Court has spoken to the issue of intra-party governance on several occasions. My earlier essays addressed three cases. In Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, ex rel. LaFollette (1981), the justices protected party convention delegates from a state requirement that they vote as directed by an open primary. In California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000), the court struck down a version of the open primary. In National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission (2026), the court voided federal campaign finance rules that inhibited how parties supported their candidates.
The Case for the Defense
Advocates of open and semi-open primary laws offer several constitutional defenses. Here are their three principal points:
- The right of association belongs to individuals, not to political parties. When the state permits parties to exclude non-members from the candidate selection process, the state violates non-members’ right to associate—that is, to help select general election candidates.
- State regulation of candidate selection is justified because states fund primary contests, which are an integral part of choosing candidates for public office at the general election.
- Certain Supreme Court decisions authorize, and even require, the state to qualify party governance.
A recent article by Jeremy Gruber, an officer in the Open Primaries organization, contains all three of those points.
Whose Right Is It?
The first defense is that the right of association is purely individual and, as Gruber states, “does not belong to political parties.”
The First Amendment explicitly guarantees six separate rights. The Establishment Clause ensures impartial governmental treatment of different religions. The other five are free exercise of religion, “the freedom of speech,” “the freedom … of the press,” assembly, and petition.
Of course, assembly and petition are inherently collective; the individual’s right to assembly necessarily implies acting as part of a group, and petitioning is almost always a group activity. But the other three rights almost always entail group activity as well. Collective worship is central to the exercise of nearly all religions. The right of free exercise guarantees Presbyterians, for example, the right to organize congregations, and to exclude Catholics, Jews, and atheists.
Similarly, freedom of the press would be almost meaningless without the right to organize. Newspapers require the cooperation of investors, executives, editors, printers, reporters, designers, promoters, advertising salespersons, and distributors. No one suggests that the liberal New York Times must include on its staff people from the conservative New York Post, or that either the Gray Lady or the Post must admit to its halls anyone who chooses to be there. Even far less elaborate exercise of freedom of the press, such as the composition, printing, and distribution of a flier—or the posting of an Internet op-ed—requires mutual cooperation. No one suggests that to write for Law & Liberty, I have to permit random people to help me compose.
Unless freedom of speech is limited to street corner declamation, the same is true for that right as well. Some form of association, even if transitory, is necessary to hire a hall for a public address, sell tickets, admit the crowd, and clean up. No one suggests that those hostile to the speaker must be admitted to the process.
These realities are why the Supreme Court infers a right of association from the freedoms the First Amendment explicitly lists. That right of association surely belongs to individuals, but because organizations consist of individuals, it belongs to organizations as well. Indeed, you can summarize the right of association and its concomitant right to exclude either way—as an organizational or an individual prerogative: The right of a political party to choose a nominee is the right of individual members (or their delegates) to vote on the candidates. The right of the party to exclude non-members is the right of each member to choose for himself, unimpeded by those who might prefer a different choice.
As Justice Scalia wrote for the court in California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000), excluding from a party primary voters who refuse to join, “seems to us less unfair than permitting nonparty members to hijack the party.”
Remember also that a voter who would like to participate in the party selection process is free to do so by simply registering with that party. He is free to de-register immediately after the election. He also may form his own party or to help qualify independent candidates for the ballot by way of the petition process.
Those claiming that a closed primary law “disenfranchises” an unaffiliated voter overlook the reality that the so-called “disenfranchisement” is a product of the voter’s own political decision.
State Funding
The second constitutional defense of mandatory open and semi-open primary laws is that state regulation of candidate selection is justified because states fund party primaries. They do so as an integral part of structuring the choice of candidates for the general election to public office.
Some people raising this defense may assume the state pays for primaries as a favor to the parties. To the extent that this assumption is true, then open and semi-open primary laws directly violate the Supreme Court’s unconstitutional conditions doctrine: a government may not condition a benefit (in this case, funding) on the surrender of a First Amendment right (in this case, association).
In fact, however, the assumption that public funding is designed to benefit parties is mostly false. States fund primaries for reasons of their own.
State funding of intra-party contests began as part of the Progressive project during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Progressives argued that existing candidate-selection procedures—caucuses, conventions, and the like—were corrupt and insufficiently democratic. They also argued that the common practice of funding primaries with steep candidate registration fees benefited wealthy candidates and excluded some of modest means.
Progressives therefore lobbied for state laws requiring party primaries and subjecting those contests to detailed state regulation. State funding facilitated state control and substantially reduced candidate registration fees. In Bullock v. Carter (1972), the Supreme Court issued dicta approving state funding for the latter purpose.
Whether the Progressives were correct in their conclusions is a matter for debate, because corruption was not a necessary concomitant of preexisting systems. But the correctness of their conclusion is not relevant here. What is relevant is that the state does not fund primaries for the benefit of the parties, but for its own purposes.
However, all government regulations and funding schemes are limited by constitutional rights. The fact that the government regulates a subject extensively does not justify adopting even more extensive regulations infringing constitutional rights.
Supreme Court Decisions
As noted above, a set of three Supreme Court decisions suggests that mandatory open and semi-open primary laws are unconstitutional. In his defense of open primaries, however, Mr. Gruber offered a three-fold set of his own: United States v. Classic (1941), Smith v. Allwright (1944), and Terry v. Adams (1953).
Of course, his cases precede mine by many years. To the extent that his and my sets are inconsistent, the earlier cases have been disapproved or overruled. Happily, though, there is no inconsistency.
Classic held merely that Congress may govern congressional primary elections pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate congressional elections under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the US Constitution. Under the same clause, states may do so as well; and of course they can regulate other elections under their respective constitutions. To my knowledge, today no one seriously disputes that.
The Smith and Terry cases held that in crafting election procedures, the states may not invade rights protected by the US Constitution. Thus, these two cases actually support the conclusion that laws mandating open and semi-open primaries are unconstitutional. There, the relevant right was one secured by the Fifteenth Amendment; here, the relevant right is secured by the First.
In Jones, the losing side and the dissent also relied on Smith and Terry, provoking the following from the court:
“Respondents misplace their reliance on Smith v. Allwright … and Terry v. Adams … which held not that party affairs are public affairs, free of First Amendment protections … but only that, when a State prescribes an election process that gives a special role to political parties, the parties’ discriminatory action becomes state action under the Fifteenth Amendment.
“The dissent is therefore wrong to conclude that Allwright and Terry demonstrate that “the protections that the First Amendment affords to the internal processes of a political party do not encompass a right to exclude nonmembers from voting in a state-required, state-financed primary election.” … Those cases simply prevent exclusion that violates some independent constitutional proscription.”
These issues are under litigation right now. A case currently pending in Texas challenges that state’s open primary law. One pending in Colorado challenges a semi-open primary requirement. The Wyoming Supreme Court recently upheld a legislative measure to protect that state’s closed primary system by preventing voters from making last-minute party registration switches.
If the Texas or Colorado case ends up in the US Supreme Court, there is a significant chance that the justices will decide that laws opening party primaries to non-party members violate the First Amendment and are therefore unconstitutional.
